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6. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE NEW JUDICIAL 
FEDERALISM: WHY STATE COURTS SHOULD NOT 
CONSIDER OUT-OF- STATE BACKLASH 
NEAL DEVINS 
I. I NTRODUCTION 
Thirty years after Justice William Brennan's call for state courts to "step into the 
breach" left by the U.S. Supreme Court's supposed underenforcement of indi-
vidual rights protections, the contours of the "new judicial federalism" remain a 
mystery. 1 There is , of course, the methodological question about whether state 
courts should rely on state-specific sources (the text and history of the state con-
stitution) and, in so doing, develop a "coherent discourse of state constitutional 
law."2 More fundamentally, does Brennan's call for a new judicial federalism 
have anything to do with federalism or is Brennan simply a "false prophet," 
asking states to pick up the slack for a recalcitrant Supreme Court and pursuing 
the Warren Court's nationalistic agenda of expanding civil and individual rights 
protections?3 Under this view, it simply does not matter whether state courts 
employ a "coherent discourse of state constitutional law"; all that matters is that 
state courts expand rights protections. 
In sorting out whether the "new federalism" has anything to do with federal-
ism, traditionally understood, this chapter considers recent battles over same-sex 
marriage. In particular, I will examine whether state courts should consider out-
of-state backlash when deciding cases. For example, when assessing whether to 
extend marriage protections to same-sex couples, should the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court have taken into account the possibility that its ruling 
would contribute to the electoral defeat of presidential candidate John Kerry or 
the enactment of state constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage? 
If the "new federalism" is simply a rallying call for the nationalistic expansion of 
rights, such out-of-state effects should matter. But if the "new federalism" is 
about sovereign, independent states serving as "laboratories" where new legal 
1. William J. Brennan, Jr. , State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
H ARV. L. R EV. 489, 503 (1977). 
2. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 
761, 764 (1992). 
3. Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet-justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional 
Law, 15 HAsT. CoNST. L.Q. 429 (1988) . 
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concepts can be tried out, there is simply no principled reason for state courts to 
take out-of-state resistance into account. 
In the pages that follow, I will argue that the new judicial federalism should be 
something more than window dressing for an outcome-driven nationalistic agenda. 
For this very reason, I will defend the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court to protect same-sex marriage in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health. 
Unlike critics of the decision, I will argue that the Massachusetts court did not 
engage in judicial overreaching by failing to take into account out-of-state backlash. 
At the same time, I will explain why state courts should take into account in-state 
backlash when deciding cases. State courts cannot serve as laboratories in a new 
judicial federalism if their decisions are ignored or nullified. Likewise, state courts 
cannot pursue doctrinal innovations if judges fail to win reelection because they 
pursued politically unacceptable causes. In other words, just as the U.S. Supreme 
Court seeks to protect its turf and maximize its influence over the other branches, 
state supreme courts should take implementation concerns into account. 
This chapter proceeds in two parts. First, I will explain why state courts should 
pay attention to in-state but not out-of-state backlash. I will discuss both the need 
for courts to pay attention to the practical consequences of their decisions and 
how that need should be channeled through the lens of the "new judicial 
federalism." Moreover, in arguing that state courts should not consider the extra-
territorial effects of their decisions, I will draw a distinction between two types of 
out-of-state backlash. Although state courts should not consider the potential 
out-of-state backlash of their decisions, it is nevertheless sensible for state courts 
to look to the experiences of other states in assessing whether there will be an 
in-state backlash. State courts, in other words, are both independent (doing right 
by the citizens of their state without considering negative out-of-state effects) 
and part of a national system (recognizing that the experiences of other states are 
instructive in assessing what type of decision best serves in-state interests). 
Second, I will apply the principles of the first part of the chapter to same-sex 
marriage, focusing my attention on four states that rejected state prohibitions 
against it: Hawaii (1993) , Vermont (1999), Massachusetts (2003), and California 
(2008). By looking at the state political culture at the time of the decision, I will 
criticize the decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court, defend the decisions of the 
Massachusetts and Vermont courts, and offer a mixed assessment of the 
California Supreme Court. In Hawaii, the state supreme court went out of its 
way to push its views upon a reluctant legislature and hostile electorate. In sharp 
contrast, courts in Vermont and Massachusetts took steps to minimize conflict 
and, in so doing, staved off efforts to undermine these court decisions through 
legislation or constitutional amendments. Vermont and Massachusetts are 
instructive for another reason: because it is extremely difficult to amend the state 
constitutions in these two states, the decisions of these courts are largely 
insulated from potential voter backlash. In sharp contrast, many western states 
facilitate voter-driven constitutional initiatives. For this very reason, the California 
court-while having reason to believe that its decision would be acceptable to 
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state political leaders and perhaps a majority of California voters-should have 
considered delaying its same-sex marriage ruling. 
II. POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY AND THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 
State court judges should care whether people would be outraged by their 
rulings.• In part, courts have no choice but to be consequentialist. Lacking the 
power of the purse and the sword, a judge's power "rests on the willingness of 
the public, and the political actors accountable to it, to respect his independence 
and the decrees of the court. "5 Beyond the practical necessity of taking potential 
backlash into account, the new judicial federalism offers a second account of 
why state courts ought to consider the consequences of their decisions. The new 
federalism is premised on the belief that constitutionalism is not a "single set of 
truths" but rather an ongoing national discourse about "ideas ofliberty, equality, 
and due process. "6 Under this view, state courts learn from each other so that one 
state's experience informs the decision making of another state . State courts 
therefore should look to other states in assessing the effectiveness of competing 
decisional rules. In saying that state courts should pay attention to consequences, 
however, the new federalism draws a sharp line between a state court learning 
from another state's experience and its recalibrating a decisional rule for fear of 
out-of-state backlash. The new federalism, properly understood, treats state 
courts as independent entities-not simply part of a larger national discourse. 
This section will spell out these two accounts of why state courts ought to be 
consequentialist. First, I will detail the institutional incentives for courts, espe-
cially state courts, to take backlash into account. Second, I will discuss the "new 
judicial federalism," focusing on the fundamental distinction between in- and 
out-of-state backlash. 
A. Institutional Incentives 
Supreme court justices (both state and federal) have "institutional preferences 
that may enhance or weaken the strength of [their] ideological preferences."7 
4. This sentence plays off the title of Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by 
Their Rulings, Should judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REv. 155 (2007). Like Sunstein's article, this 
section will consider both normative and consequential arguments about the relevance of 
backlash. Unlike Sunstein, however, I will consider this question through the lens of the 
new judicial federalism-where states are at once independent and part of a national 
dialogue about the appropriate scope of rights protections. By contrast, Sunstein's analysis 
seems tied to a unitary court system and is therefore most useful in thinking about U.S. 
Supreme Court interpretations of federal law. 
5. Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEx. L. REv. 257 (2005). 
6. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 1147, 1147 (1993). 
7. Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading 
ofUnited States v. Lopez, 46 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 757, 783 (1996). 
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In particular, implementation concerns sometimes figure into court decisions. 
This is true for the U.S. Supreme Court (where life tenure and an extremely 
burdensome constitutional amendment process significantly reduce the risk of 
backlash). And it is especially true for state supreme courts (where, in many 
states, there is great risk of backlash because of judicial elections, interest group-
driven initiatives, and the relative ease of amending state constitutions). 
In understanding why courts should take backlash into account, consequen-
tialists focus their attention on whether court rulings actually advance the goals 
intended by the court. A second reason why consequentialists should care about 
backlash is the larger interest of courts to maintain judicial power in our system 
of divided government. Each of these arguments has common sense appeal, and 
each argument is tied to one of the dominant models that political scientists use 
to explain Supreme Court decision making (external strategic actor and new 
institutionalism).8 Embracing the teachings of the external strategic actor model, 
consequentialists argue that judges should be both goal-oriented and strategic so 
that "the preferences and likely actions of other relevant actors" shape the con-
tours of judicial decision making.9 Under this view, judges should be policy max-
imizers, advancing preferred outcomes without risking a counterproductive 
backlash. Second, by making use of the new intuitionalism, consequentialists 
argue that judges seek to preserve, if not strengthen, the court's institutional 
capital. Specifically, the new institutionalism emphasizes that the Supreme 
Court has institutional as well as policy-maximizing goals. Under this view, 
Supreme Court justices see the Court as an institution whose identity is defined 
by patterns of interaction with other parts of government. Accordingly, the Court 
cannot lose sight of its responsibilities to "maintain a distinctive and valued pres-
ence in the political system" by advancing some "vision of the special functions 
that [it] should perform."10 
8. A third political science model, the attitudinalist model, claims that U.S. Supreme 
Court justices vote their policy preferences without fear of political backlash. See JEFFREY 
A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED (2002) . Defenders of this model contend that the U.S. Supreme Court is largely 
irisulated from political backlash; consequently, there is no reason for the justices to cali-
brate their decisions iri anticipation of political backlash. Although generally correct, the 
attitudinalist model overstates matters. As the balance of this section will demonstrate, 
the attitudinalist model does not extend to state supreme courts-where fears of political 
reprisals are often substantial. 
9. Lee Epsteiri et al., The Political (Science) Context ofjudging, 47 ST. Louis L.J . 783, 
800 (2003). For a more detailed explication of this model, see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, 
THE CHoicEs JusTICES MAKE (1997). 
10. Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive 
Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SuPREME CouRT 
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 85 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard 
Gillman, eds., 1999) . 
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Examples of the U.S. Supreme Court taking social and political forces into 
account when deciding cases are legion. Numerous studies have empirically 
established that the Court shapes its "decisions and methods according to their 
perceived vulnerability to congressional override" and that it takes "cues regard-
ing public and political interest and acceptability of outcomes from the public 
and organized interests."11 
State courts likewise take into account potential opposition to their rulings. 
As one state supreme court justice put it: "There's no way a judge is going to be 
able to ignore the political consequences of certain decisions . .. . That would be 
like ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub." 12 In death penalty cases, empirical 
studies demonstrate that "politicization of the death issue has affected state court 
behavior."13 More relevant to this chapter (and something I will discuss in greater 
detail in the next section) , the Vermont Supreme Court made explicit reference 
to its fear of political reprisals in explaining why there was a state constitutional 
right to civil unions but not to same-sex marriage. 
State courts are especially sensitive to possible in-state backlash for two rea-
sons. First, state constitutions are much easier to amend than the federal consti-
tution. Of more than 5,000 proposed amendments to the U.S . Constitution, only 
seventeen have been approved since the Bill of Rights and only three amend-
ments explicitly overruled decisions of the U.S . Supreme Court. State constitu-
tions , in contrast, have been amended more than 5,000 times.14 From 1996-1997, 
for example, forty-two states considered 233 proposed constitutional amendments, 
approving 178 of them. 15 Second, state judges are often subject to direct demo-
cratic control. In the majority of states, justices are either elected or subject to 
retention votes. Empirical studies back up the common sense notion that judi-
cial selection methods "significantly affect judicial policy in several important 
areas of the law."16 Indeed, the success of interest groups in pushing for either 
11. Tonja jacobi, Sharing the Love: The Political Power of Remedial Delay in Same-Sex 
Marriage Cases, 15 LAw & SEXUALITY REv. 11 , 28 (2006) (citing studies). See also NEAL 
DEVINS & LOUIS FISH ER, TH E DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004); Frank B. Cross & Blake 
). Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 Nw. U.L. REv. 
1437 (2001) . 
12. This quote comes from California Supreme Court justice Otto Kaus. It is favorably 
quoted by Washington Supreme Court Justice Robert F. Utter in State Constitutional Law, 
The United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability, 64 WASH. L. REv. 19 
(1989). 
13. john Blume & Theodore Eisenberg. judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case 
Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. C AL. L. REv. 465 , 503 (1999) . 
14. john Kincaid, State Constitutions in the Federal System, 496 ANNALS 12, 14 (Mar. 
1988) . 
15. Janice C. May, Amending State Constitutions 1996-97, 30 RuTG ERS L.J. 1025 (1999) . 
16. DANI EL R. PINELLO, TH E IMPACT OF jUDICIAL-S ELECTION METHOD ON STATE· 
SUPREME-CO URT POLI CY 130 (1996) . 
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the election or removal of state court judges has called into question the 
impartiality of state court decision making and, more generally, is considered a 
profound threat to the independence of state court systems. 
Not only are state courts less insulated from popular reprisals than federal 
courts, state courts are far better positioned than federal courts to weigh the costs 
and benefits of potential backlash: "[S]tate judges are systematically exposed to 
and experienced in the legal institutions of their states;" "state judges spend 
their professional lives dealing with state legislation and administration regula-
tion;" "[t]hey are much more likely than are their federal counterparts to know or 
be able to learn readily what is out there, how it came to be, and how well or badly 
it works." 17 
Of course, state court knowledge of in-state traditions does not extend beyond 
state boundaries. State judges know about their states and can make conse-
quentialist judgments about the potential backlash of a decision there. But state 
judges do not know about the on-the-ground facts and legal traditions of other 
states, so they cannot be expected to make informed judgments about out-of-
state backlash. 
Another reason that state judges ought not to think about out-of-state back-
lash is tied to the new judicial federalism. Although part of a national discourse, 
state courts must retain their essential sovereignty-an issue that I will now 
address. 
B. The New Judicial Federalism and Out-of-State Backlash 
The new judicial federalism sees the states as critical players in the shaping of 
national constitutional values. Although there are as many iterations of this "new 
federalism" as there are law professors and judges who have written on this 
topic, proponents generally fall into one of two camps. The fault line here is 
whether a state court has some obligation to undertake an independent analysis 
of the state's constitution or, alternatively, may it "simply disagree with contem-
porary Supreme Court methods or doctrines in applying its state constitution 
without searching for special reasons in the state's text or traditions"?18 
Without minimizing the importance of this question, let me suggest a para-
digm shift so that the focus of the inquiry becomes the implementation of a state 
court's preferred doctrine. This question has received no attention in the litera-
ture, even though state courts have been criticized for not taking out-of-state 
backlash into account. Decisions by the Hawaii and Massachusetts Supreme 
Court on same-sex marriage have been savaged on these very grounds (princi-
pally by supporters of same-sex marriage) as "disastrous" and "provok[ing] the 
17. Lawrence Gene Sager, State Courts and the Strategic Space between the Norms and 
Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REv. 959, 976 (1985) . 
18. Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions are Not Common Law, 24 RuTGERS L.J. 927, 931 
(1993). 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND T HE NEW JU D ICIAL FEDE RALISM 87 
biggest anti-gay backlash since the McCarthy era."19 In the next section, I will 
discuss this backlash, but for now I want to focus on whether and when state 
courts should think about out-of-state implementation. 
Federalism assumes that states have different laws and that state supreme 
courts speak authoritatively about the meaning of state law. Correspondingly, in 
determining whether to embrace one or another legal rule, state courts have 
unique responsibilities to their citizens rather than to the country as a whole. In 
particular, state courts ought not to limit the rights of their citizens in order to 
stave off a potential out-of-state backlash (assuming that out-of-state backlash 
does not boomerang into a federal constitutional amendment or federal law that 
undermines a state court ruling) . 
There is a second reason that state courts ought not to consider out-of-state 
backlash. For states to serve as laboratories in a nationwide conversation about 
constitutional values, states must experiment. In-state backlash is relevant to 
these experiments, but out-of-state backlash has no bearing on them. Specifically, 
state courts must preserve space in which they are allowed to experiment. In-state 
backlash undercuts judicial authority and may limit the types of experiments 
that states can pursue. Out-of-state backlash is quite another matter. Assuming 
no in-state boomerang effect, out-of-state backlash has no bearing on in-state 
experimentation. 
At the same time, state courts can learn from the implementation experiences 
of other states. If interest groups (especially national interest groups) seek to 
oust judges or pursue constitutional reforms in one state, there is no reason to 
think those groups will not seek to countermand similar decision making in 
other states. And if these efforts either fail or are not pursued in the first instance, 
state courts may have reason to think that they have greater room for experimen-
tation. Separate and apart from direct repeal efforts, state courts may see whether 
those subject to a court order follow it or, alternatively, resist the ruling by either 
dragging their feet or ignoring it altogether. If there is some type of nonaquies-
ence, it may make sense to pursue a different remedial strategy. 
This, of course, is what the new judicial federalism is all about-state courts 
learning from each other and "contributing to the larger project of interpreting 
shared constitutional text."20 Sometimes state courts will be pathbreakers, pursu-
ing doctrinal innovations that may shape decision making in other states. At 
other times states will wait and see if other states' approaches point to a better 
way of interpreting state law. Whatever role a state chooses to play, out-of-state 
backlash ought not to limit state innovations. 
19. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Lookingfor Change in All the Wrong Places, 
54 DRAK E L. REV. 795, 812 (2006) ; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. , EQUALITY PRACTICE 26 
(2002) . 
20. Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Values of Dialogue and the New judicial 
Federalism, 28 HAST. CaNST. L.Q. 93 , 137 (2000) . 
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One final observation before turning to the same-sex marriage case study: 
state judges are engaged in two distinct, interrelated constitutional dialogues. To 
the extent that state courts pay attention to what has happened in other states 
and make doctrinal moves that inform the judgments of other state courts, the 
new judicial federalism has a nationalistic cast. Most advocates of the new feder-
alism emphasize this side of things, talking broadly about the "values placed in 
a constitution" and about constitutionalism as "not a single set of truths , but an 
ongoing debate about the meaning of the rule of law in a democratic political 
order."21 But states are not simply minions in some larger national enterprise. 
State courts also participate in an intrastate dialogue that includes state lawmak-
ers and voters. They "need not apologize for undercutting national unity" if they 
validate the ways in which states are different from one another. 22 
Ill. THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
Academic and popular commentary about state court efforts to extend marriage 
or civil union rights to same-sex couples has largely focused on out-of-state back-
lash. In particular, the Hawaii and Massachusetts supreme courts have been 
sharply criticized for triggering a host of anti-gay legislative enactments and con-
stitutional amendments. These attacks have largely ignored the question of 
whether these courts operated within their state's social and political norms. In 
the pages that follow, I will address that very question. 
My discussion will be organized chronologically, focusing on rulings by the 
supreme courts of Hawaii (1993), Vermont (1999), Massachusetts (2003), and 
California (2008). In so doing, I will call attention to the way state courts can 
learn from the experiences of other states while, at the same time, respecting 
essential state sovereignty by refusing to consider the extraterritorial effects of 
their decisions. This , as Section I details, is the core principle of the new federal-
ism-a principle that allows states to be both independent and part of a national 
conversation. It is also a principle at odds with the nationalistic goals of Justice 
Brennan and other proponents of rights-expanding state court decision making. 
In particular, state courts may sometimes have good reasons (consistent with the 
new federalism) to expand in-state rights while simultaneously prompting an 
out-of-state backlash that frustrates the pursuit of a nationwide expansion of 
rights. 
Bad Beginnings: Hawaii. The nationwide debate over same-sex marriage was 
triggered by Baehr v. Lewin,23 a 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court decision that found 
21. Kahn, supra note 6, at 1148; Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State 
Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REv. 389, 442 (1998) . 
22. Linde, supra note 18, at 932. 
23 . 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) . 
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Hawaii's prohibition of same-sex marriage to be gender discrimination. Rather 
than formally grant same-sex couples the right to marry, however, the court 
remanded the case to see if the state could demonstrate that its prohibition 
satisfied strict scrutiny review. Over the next five years (while the litigation 
worked its way back towards the Hawaii Supreme Court), Hawaii lawmakers 
struggled with the court's decision. On the one hand, the lawmakers reached out 
to gays and lesbians by enacting domestic partnership laws and, in so doing, 
established "the most sweeping protections ever offered to same-sex couples 
anywhere in the U.S."24 On the other hand, demonstrating their commitment to 
traditional marriage, lawmakers both passed a law limiting marriage contracts to 
those between a man and woman and sent to state voters a constitutional amend-
ment proposal that would grant the state legislature the power to outlaw same-
sex marriage. In November, 1998, Hawaii voters approved that amendment by a 
69 to 29 percent margin, thus mooting the Baehr litigation. 25 
Baehr did much more than set in motion an intrastate dialogue about same-
sex marriage. After Baehr, "an issue that had been a curiosity became an apoca-
lyptic sensation."26 State lawmakers, fearing that lesbians and gays would travel 
to Hawaii to get married and then seek to have those marriages recognized at 
home, enacted legislation prohibiting recognition of same-sex marriages. 
Between 1995 and 2001, thirty-five states enacted nonrecognition lawsY For its 
part, Congress enacted and President Clinton signed the 1996 Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA). 28 DOMA, as the House Committee report put it, was a 
"response to a very particular development in the State ofHawaii."29 Echoing the 
concerns of state nonrecognition laws, Congress declared that "permitting 
homosexual couples to marry in Hawaii threatens to have very real consequences 
both on federal law and on the laws (especially the marriage laws) of the various 
States."30 
Baehr, it would seem, did more harm than good to the cause of same-sex 
marriage. Outside of Hawaii, the federal DOMA and state nonrecognition stat-
utes were a huge setback for proponents of same-sex marriage. In Hawaii, the 
state constitutional amendment foreclosed court-ordered same-sex marriage; 
proponents of same-sex marriage would now have to convince state lawmakers 
to repeal existing bans on same-sex marriage. The question remains: did the 
24. Martin Bowley, Same-Sex Couples, Different Rules, THE LAWYER, Sept. 16, 1997 at 13. 
25. For a detailed discussion of the politics behind the Hawaii Marriage amendment, 
see David Organ Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning, and 
Fate, 22 U. HAw. L. REv. 19 (2000). 
26. EsKRIDGE , supra note 19, at 26. 
27. !d. at 27-28. 
28. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) . 
29. H.R. Rep. No. 104-664 at 2 (1996) . 
30. Id. 
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Hawaii Supreme Court have reason to think that its ruling would prompt a 
counterproductive in-state backlash and, if so, what should it have done? 
To start, the Hawaii Supreme Court, by taking the lead on this issue, did not 
know that court-ordered same-sex marriage would prove to be a nationwide sen-
sation. This issue was not on the national radar at the time of the decision; 
indeed, it was the uproar over Baehr that prompted Gallup to start polling on 
same-sex marriage in 1996. So what did the Hawaii Supreme Court know? It 
knew that there was nationwide hostility to President Clinton's efforts to signifi-
cantly expand gay rights protections. At the very time that the Hawaii Supreme 
Court decided Baehr, lawmakers were crafting the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" law 
that prevented open gays from serving in the military. The court also knew that 
social conservatives were paying close attention to the case. The Rutherford 
Institute, for example, filed an amicus brief urging the state court to reject same-
sex marriage.31 More significant, the court probably knew that Hawaii voters did 
not support same-sex marriage. A 1991 Honolulu Star Bulletin poll found that 
"only 34 percent [of Hawaii residents] think couples of the same sex should be 
allowed to marry and only 36 percent think such couples should be allowed to 
adopt children."32 The court may also have known that national gay rights inter-
est groups played no role in the filing of the lawsuit, worried that the case was 
corning too early.33 And finally, the court knew that it was easy to amend the 
Hawaii Constitution-all that is needed to refer a constitutional amendment to 
a majority referendum vote is the support of a majority of lawmakers over two 
legislative sessions (or a two-thirds supermajority in one session). 
All of these bits of information suggest that the Hawaii Supreme Court had 
reason to fear an in-state backlash to a decision supporting same-sex marriage. 
At the same time, the Hawaii Court was well aware of the "island's history of 
tolerance and the state's broad privacy law," that Hawaii was the first state to 
legalize abortion, and that close to half of Hawaii's marriages are interraciaJ.3• 
Put another way, the court knew that the people of Hawaii were more likely to 
accept same-sex marriage than the citizens of any other state. 
Assuming that Hawaii's Supreme Court sincerely believed that same-sex mar-
riages should be legal. the question becomes: why wait? The answer, I think, is that 
certain risks are not worth taking. First, by ruling that all same-sex classifications 
were subject to strict scrutiny review, the court created incentives for opponents of 
31. Linda Hosek, Group Says Gays Should Not Get OK to Marry, HoNOLULU STAR 
BuLLETIN, May 23, 1992 at A-3. 
32. Linda Hosek, Residents Draw the Line on Some Gay Rights, HONOLULU STAR 
BuLLETIN, Apr. 24, 1991 at A-4. 
33. EsKRIDGE, supra note 19, at 16-17. 
34. Linda Hosek, Isles May Be First for Gay Marriage, HoNOLULU STAR BuLLETIN, Apr. 
24, 1991 at A-1.; Sherry Jacobson, Hawaii Debates Gay Marriage: States May Recognize Such 
Unions After Court Ruling, DALLAS MoRNING NEws, Sept. 17, 1993 at A-1. 
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same-sex marriage to harden their position and to look for ways either to argue 
that the same-sex prohibition satisfies strict review or to amend the Hawaii 
Constitution to forbid same-sex unions. Instead, the court should have looked for 
ways in which the state and Hawaiian people could have found a way to work 
within parameters set by the court. For example, the court could have signaled its 
willingness to consider domestic partner or civil union legislation. Hawaii law-
makers were open to such legislative outs; in the wake of Baehr, Hawaii lawmakers 
enacted sweeping domestic partnership legislation. Second, not only did the 
Hawaii court go too far, it went too fast. An intermediate state court had upheld the 
same-sex marriage prohibition. Rather than fill the breach immediately, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court could have declined to hear the case without expressing any opin-
ion about the constitutionality of the marriage ban. That is precisely what the U.S. 
Supreme Court did in 1955 when, fearing a political backlash, it delayed ruling on 
a constitutional challenge to Virginia's anti-miscegenation law.35 
Let me be clear: unlike other critics of the Hawaii Supreme Court (who point 
to the federal DOMA and nonrecognition statutes passed by states other than 
Hawaii), my criticism focuses on the state court's failure to think about in-state 
concerns. The Hawaii Court should have either refused to hear the appeal in this 
case or decided the case narrowly so as to limit backlash. 
The Triumph ofMinimalism: Vermont. Six years after the Hawaii court's misstep 
in Baehr, the Vermont Supreme Court took a fundamentally different approach to 
same-sex marriage in Baker v State.36 Although finding that the Vermont 
Constitution guarantees same-sex couples "the common benefit, protection, and 
security that Vermont law provides opposite-sex married couples ," the Vermont 
court refused to extend marriage protections to same-sex couples. The court 
instead ruled that Vermont's existing statute should remain in effect "for a rea-
sonable period of time to enable the Legislature to consider and enact implement-
ing legislation in an orderly and expeditious fashion." 37 By remanding the case to 
the state legislature, Vermont opened the door for state lawmakers to determine 
if they wanted to legalize same-sex marriage or, alternatively, enact civil union 
legislation that would provide "marriage protections to same-sex couples." 
In explaining its refusal to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples, the 
court spoke openly about its fear of a counterproductive in-state backlash. 
Expressing its desire both to issue a remedy that would endure and to provide 
"[greater] protections for same-sex relationships than have been recognized by" 
any state supreme court other than Hawaii, the court concluded that it would be 
too politically risky to order the state to grant marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples. Indeed, the court chastised a concurring opinion that called for the 
35. for a defense of the Court's decision, see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST D ANGEROUS 
BRANCH 174 (1962). 
36. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
37. !d. at 886. 
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outright recognition of same-sex marriage as "significantly insulated from 
reality."38 
For reasons I will soon detail, it is far from clear whether Vermonters would 
have repudiated a state supreme court decision ordering same-sex marriage. At 
the same time, the Vermont court's political calculation was eminently sensible. 
To start, the Baker decision took place against the backdrop of Hawaii's repudia-
tion of same-sex marriage in Baehr. More than that, Alaska lawmakers and voters 
preempted an ongoing challenge to Alaska's marriage laws by approving a con-
stitutional amendment barring same-sex marriage. 39 Specifically, in the immedi-
ate wake of a February 1998 trial court ruling that same-sex couples had a 
fundamental right to marry, Alaska lawmakers (in March 1998) put a constitu-
tional amendment proposal on the November ballot. That proposal was approved 
by a lopsided 68 to 32 percent vote. 
The Hawaii and Alaska experiences are relevant for another reason. The 
Alaska and Hawaii constitutional amendment fights were financed, in part, by 
out-of-state interest groups. The national movement to enact the federal DOMA 
and state non-enforcement statutes was also propelled by national interest 
groups. Throughout the 1990s, moreover, social conservatives had pushed (with 
great success) state-wide initiatives limiting gay rights in at least a dozen states. 
So when the Vermont Supreme Court received seventeen amicus briefs from 
national interest groups, it had reason to know that a decision validating same-
sex marriage would trigger an intense political battle over whether Vermonters, 
like Hawaiians and Alaskans, should approve a state constitutional amendment 
banning same-sex marriage. And if that were not enough, a poll taken shortly 
before the release of the Baker decision revealed that Vermonters, by a 56 to 33 
percent margin, supported a constitutional amendment proposal to "keep 
Vermont's definition of marriage as the union of one man and one woman."40 
Against this backdrop, there is little doubt that judicial validation of same-sex 
marriage would have triggered a donnybrook. A constitutional amendment 
would have been introduced, and national interest groups would have invested 
significant time and resources in this constitutional amendment battle. At the 
same time, there is reason to think that a constitutional amendment proposal 
would have failed. National trends pointed to growing acceptance of gay rights. 41 
38. I d. at 888. 
39. For a detailed treatment of the events leading up to the Alaska constitutional 
amendment, see Kevin G. Clarkson et al., The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People's 
Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA L. REv. 213 (1999) . 
40. Take it to the People, Press Release, Support for Traditional Marriage Remains Strong in 
Vermont, Dec. 16, 1999. 
41. By 1999, the social conservative campaign against gay rights had slowed. A 1996 
Supreme Court decision, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) , cast doubt on the constitu-
tionality of anti-gay initiatives. A 1998 Georgia Supreme Court decision nullified--<m 
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In Vermont, the Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Rights had scored numerous 
legislative successes in the early 1990s-so much so that a public relations cam-
paign for same-sex marriage was launched in 1994.42 And although Vermonters 
opposed same-sex marriage, it was far from clear that state lawmakers would 
pursue a constitutional amendment banning it. Vermont's constitutional amend-
ment process is "notoriously difficult. . . . Legislators can introduce amendments 
only once every four years. If approved, an amendment must pass in two con-
secutive two-year legislative sessions. Only then can people vote on the 
proposal. "43 
The fact that a constitutional amendment proposal might have failed, how-
ever, does not mean that the Vermont Supreme Court erred in Baker. Even 
assuming that the court backed same-sex marriage, it had good reason to mini-
mize very real risks. By leaving it to the state legislature to sort out how best to 
remedy the state's illegal discrimination against same-sex couples, the "court, in 
effect, forced the legislature to join it in taking responsibility for fashioning and 
implementing a remedy."« In so doing, the court shifted the debate on same-sex 
marriage. Instead of fighting over a possible amendment to the state constitu-
tion, the focus of the Vermont legislature was whether to enact a civil union bill 
or legalize same-sex marriage.45 
By leaving "breathing space for participants in the democratic process," Baker 
was able to build on "an extended legislative willingness to recognize and protect 
non-traditional families , while at the same time declining to disturb the 
yet-to-be-repudiated view of traditional families ."46 A decision demanding 
marriage rights for same-sex couples would have run against the grain ofVermont 
traditions and facilitated adversarial politics. More to the point, Baker exemplifies 
what the new federalism should and should not be. The Vermont Supreme Court 
state constitutional grounds-the anti-sodomy statute that the Supreme Court had upheld 
in Bowers v Hardwick. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E. 2d 18 (Ga. 1998). Public opinion polls, 
moreover, reveal ever-growing support of gay rights, especially among younger voters. See 
Jack Egan et aJ., Gay Rights, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 234 
(Nathaniel Persily eta!. , eds., 2008) . There was thus less intense opposition to same-sex 
marriage in 1999 than there had been in 1993 (when the Hawaii Supreme Court decided 
Baehr). 
42. Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REv. 
15, 25-30 (2000). 
43 . David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Beyond Baker: The Case for a Vermont 
Marriage Amendment, 25 VT. L. REv. 61 , 68 (2000). 
44. Tonja Jacobi, Same Sex Marriage in Vermont: Implications of Legislative Remand for 
the judiciary 's Role, 26 VT. L. REv. 381, 403 (2002) . 
45. See William N. Eskridge, Liberal Reflections on the jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64 
ALB. L. REV. 853 , 870-76 (2001) . 
46. Gil Kujovich, An Essay on the Passive Virtue of Baker v. State, 25 VT. L. REv. 93 , 109 
(2000). See also Johnson , supra note 42 . 
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looked to out-of-state experiences to inform its judgment about in-state concerns. 
And although the court may have succeeded in establishing a right to same-sex 
marriage, it minimized the risks of backlash while setting in motion a process of 
incremental reform. State lawmakers could embrace the broader right, but, if not, 
the court could return to the issue of same-sex marriage. That option was not 
available to the Hawaii Supreme Court, whose unilateralism prompted a consti-
tutional amendment forbidding such court-ordered reform. 
The Massachusetts Gamble: judicial Hubris or the New judicial Federalism at 
Work?47 In November 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health48 that the state ban on same-sex mar-
riage was unconstitutional. Finding that the state either had to allow same-sex 
couples the right to marry or eliminate civil marriage altogether, the court gave 
state lawmakers 180 days to "take such action as it may deem appropriate in light 
of this opinion."49 In February 2004, acting on a request from state lawmakers to 
clarifY this ruling, the court said that only full and equal marriage rights for 
same-sex couples-not proposed civil union legislation-would satisfY the 
court's ruling. Three months later, Massachusetts became the first state to allow 
same-sex marriage. 
Reaction to the Massachusetts decision was intense. Inside Massachusetts, 
Governor Mitt Romney pushed for a constitutional amendment to overturn the 
ruling. And although lawmakers did not approve an amendment, a constitutional 
convention was convened in February 2004, and a proposed ban on same-sex mar-
riage passed through a first-stage vote in March 2004. After same-sex couples 
began marrying in May 2004, however, public opposition to same-sex marriage 
began to wane. 50 Indeed, state voters rewarded opponents of the proposed consti-
tutional ban in the November 2004 election cycle: all opponents of the ban won 
reelection, some proponents of the ban lost reelection, and opponents of the ban 
won six of eight open seats.51 By March 2005, support for same-sex marriage 
47. In writing about Massachusetts, I have benefited greatly from the work of Tonja 
Jacobi, whose published work is cited in this section. I also benefited from a student paper 
I supervised in the spring 2007 semester (before Professor Jacobi's published her 
Goodridge-related scholarship). That paper was written by Matthew Koldziej , a 2007 gradu-
ate of George Washington Law School. Although I suggested the paper topic to 
Mr. Koldziej , my interest in writing this chapter was nonetheless spurred on by 
Mr. Koldziej's outstanding paper. 
48. 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
49. Id. at 970. 
50. Tonja Jacobi, How Massachusetts Got Gay Marriage: The Intersection of Public Opinion, 
Legislative Action, and judicial Power, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISS UES 219, 221 (2006) . 
51. Tonja Jacobi, Sharing the Love: The Political Power of Remedial Delay in Same·Sex 
Marriage Cases, 15 LAw & SEXUALITY REv. 11, 39--41 (2006) . 
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among Massachusetts residents had increased to 56 percent. 52 In September 2005, 
lawmakers rejected a proposed constitutional ban of same-sex marriage by a vote 
of 157 to 39.53 With an increasingly supportive legislature and citizenry, the cam-
paign to ban same-sex marriage floundered. In November 2006, lawmakers refused 
to vote on a citizen-proposed ballot initiative. In July 2008, lawmakers repealed a 
state law prohibiting the issuance of marriage licenses to couples who could not 
marry in their home state, paving the way for same-sex couples from other states 
to marry in Massachusetts. 
Outside of Massachusetts, Goodridge proved to be a lightning rod. On the one 
hand, the decision was part of a mix of factors that in the spring and summer of 
2004 prompted city and county officials to grant marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples in San Francisco, California; Portland, Oregon; New Paltz, New York; 
and elsewhere. 54 And while state courts uniformly rejected these local initiatives 
as unauthorized usurpations of state law, Goodridge undoubtedly contributed to 
the willingness of gay rights interests to push for same-sex marriage. On the 
other hand, the collective impact of these local initiatives and Goodridge was to 
energize opponents of same-sex marriage. In an effort to appeal to their social 
conservative base, Republicans in Congress sought both to amend the 
Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage and to enact legislation stripping the 
federal courts of jurisdiction in same-sex marriage cases. Although Congress did 
not act on either proposal, there is little question that social conservatives saw 
same-sex marriage as a wedge issue in the November 2004 elections. Most tell-
ing, thirteen states approved constitutional amendment proposals forbidding 
same-sex marriage. 55 Moreover, conservative Christians helped propel the candi-
dacies of George W. Bush and other Republicans. In Ohio, for example, "political 
analysts credited the ballot measure with spurring Republican voter turnout in 
the socially conservative western and southern portions of the state."56 Same-sex 
marriage also worked to the advantage of Republicans in U.S. Senate races , pro-
viding the margin of victory in Kentucky and South Dakota. 57 
Goodridge has been roundly criticized for prompting a national backlash 
against gay rights interests. Indeed, criticism of the case has almost exclusively 
focused on this question. The issue of in-state backlash has received, at best, 
52. ScottS . Greenberger, One Year Later, Nation Divided on Gay Marriage, BosT. GLOBE, 
May 15, 2005 . 
53. Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Rejects Bill to Eliminate Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 
15, 2005 at A-14. 
54. For a discussion of how these initiatives (and other related matters) shaped public 
attitudes towards gay rights during this time, see Egan et al. , supra note 41. 
55. See Michael) . Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge) , 104 MICH. L. REv. 
431 (2005) . 
56. James Dao, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key to Some G.O.P. Race, N.Y. TIM ES, Nov. 4, 
2004 at A-4. 
57. See Klarman supra note 55, at 468-70. 
96 NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
scant attention. This is truly unfortunate. State courts, as explained earlier, ought 
not to sacrifice their essential sovereignty by taking out-of-state backlash into 
account and thereby limiting rights protections for their citizens. What then of 
potential in-state backlash at the time of Goodridge? That is something that the 
Massachusetts court should have taken into account. For reasons I will now 
detail, the Supreme Judicial Court had good reason to think that a decision grant-
ing marriage rights to same-sex couples would withstand in-state resistance. 
Furthermore, by delaying its remedial order in the case, the court successfully 
minimized in-state backlash. 58 
To start, the Supreme Judicial Court undoubtedly knew that its decision would 
prompt an outcry in Massachusetts and throughout the nation, including efforts 
to amend the Massachusetts Constitution. In anticipation of Goodridge, an initia-
tive amendment to ban same-sex marriage was proposed in the Massachusetts 
legislature in the summer of 2002. Although this measure was not acted on, 
lawmakers promised to seek a constitutional ban on same"sex marriage if the 
Supreme Judicial Court found a right to same-sex marriage in Goodridge. The 
Supreme Judicial Court also knew that these efforts would be backed by many of 
the "[h]undreds of [interest] groups" that had signed amicus briefs in the case, 
including "Catholic, Protestant fundamentalist and Orthodox Jewish groups."59 
The volatility of the same-sex marriage issue was also fueled by two June 2003 
developments: Canada's granting of marital rights to same-sex couples and the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Lawrence v. Texas that anti-sodomy statutes were 
unconstitutional.60 Lawrence is especially relevant, for Justice Scalia's dissenting 
opinion claimed that the Court's decision paved the way for a federal constitu-
tional right to same-sex marriage.61 Lawrence fueled public repudiations of same-
sex marriage by the Southern Baptist Conference and U.S. Catholic bishopsY lt 
also resulted in same-sex marriage becoming the defining issue for social conser-
vatives, including the Family Research Council and Focus on the Family. These 
groups spoke about the need "for the American people" to "rise up and defend 
this indispensable institution" because "the homosexual activist movement . .. 
is poised to administer a devastating . . . blow to the traditional family."63 
58. For a detailed treatment of this issue, see Jacobi, supra note 50. 
59. Kathleen Burge, SJC Puts Off a Decision on Gay Marriage, BosT. GLOB E, July 15, 
2003 at A-1; Kathleen Burge, S]C to Weigh Arguments on Gay Marriage, BosT. GLOB E, Mar. 
2, 2003 at A-1. 
60. See Egan et al. , supra note 41. 
61. See Esther Kaplan, The Religious Right's Sense of Siege is Fueling a Resurgence, NATION, 
July 5, 2004 at 33. 
62. See Klarman, supra note 55 , at 460. 
63 . Mary Leonard, Gay Marriage Stirs Conservatives Again, BosT. GLOB E, Sept. 28, 2003 
at A-1; Christopher Marquis, U.S. Gays Who Marry in Canada Face Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 19, 2003 at A-8. 
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Finally, Lawrence contributed to an increase in public opposition to same-sex mar-
riage at the very time that the Massachusetts court was set to decide Goodridge. 
The Massachusetts court was well aware of all this. Just weeks after the U.S . 
Supreme Court decided Lawrence, the Massachusetts court announced that it 
would delay its decision in Goodridge. Three months earlier (when hearing oral 
arguments in Goodridge) , justices on the Massachusetts court likewise signaled 
their sensitivity to the interplay between the court, the Massachusetts legislature, 
and the public. In particular, the justices quizzed both sides on the appropriate-
ness of the court resolving the same-sex marriage issue and the related possibil-
ity that Massachusetts voters (through a constitutional amendment) or legislators 
(through civil union legislation) might be able to resolve this issue.64 By the time 
the justices decided Goodridge, they almost certainly knew that lawmakers sup-
ported civil union legislation but not the constitutionalization of same-sex 
marriage. 
Why then did the Massachusetts court test the limits of its authority by estab-
lishing a right to same-sex marriage? The short answer is that the justices sup-
ported a right to same-sex marriage and thought that a decision establishing 
such a right would stick. To start, the Massachusetts Constitution is difficult to 
amend. Massachusetts is one of nineteen states that has had only one constitu-
tion, and among those states, it has the lowest amendment rate. 65 Amendments 
must be voted on in two successive legislative sessions before being submitted 
to the voters. This process is , by definition, time-consuming. It is intended to 
ensure that there is continuing public and lawmaker support for an amendment 
proposal. Against this backdrop, public opinion seemed to be on the side of 
Goodridge. Opinion polls taken just before the decision revealed that Massachusetts 
residents supported same-sex marriage 50 to 44 percent. And although Goodridge 
might have influenced public opinion (by focusing both state and national atten-
tion on same-sex marriage), the justices had reason to think that the decision 
would not result in sustained support for a constitutional amendment banning 
same-sex marriage. In addition to somewhat favorable polling numbers at the 
time of the decision, public support for gay rights , including same-sex marriage, 
was on the rise . That trend was likely to continue as younger voters overwhelmingly 
supported gay rights, including same-sex marriage. More than that, the justices 
knew that their decision would take effect in May 2004-at least two years before 
a constitutional amendment proposal could make its way to voters. That would 
likely mitigate opposition to same-sex marriage; in particular, the burden of 
inertia would likely favor it. A constitutional amendment would ask voters to 
64. From judges, Pointed Questions, BosT. GLOBE, Mar. 5, 2003 at A-6. 
65. Donald S. Lutz, Towards a Theory of Constitutional Amendment 248-49, in 
R ESPONDING TO IM PERFECTION (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) . 
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take away a preexisting right rather than (as was true in other states) back up 
existing state policy against same-sex marriage.66 
The justices, moreover, took strategic steps to mitigate public and lawmaker 
opposition to their rulings. Rather than call for immediate implementation of 
court-ordered same-sex marriage, the Massachusetts court remanded the case to 
the legislature for 180 days. At the same time, by ruling on "basic premises of 
individual liberty and equality of the law," the court also made clear that same-
sex couples had a constitutional right to marry (strongly suggesting that civil 
union legislation would likewise be unconstitutional) Y This legislative remand 
suggests one of two things. First, it created an escape hatch so that the court 
could embrace civil union legislation if the in-state backlash against its decision 
were truly severe. Second, the court-albeit with a wink and a nod-returned the 
issue to the democratic branches to build public and lawmaker support for same-
sex marriage. Not only did the court signal that the "legislature retains broad 
regulatory power over civil marriage," it sought to facilitate legislative support 
of same-sex unions (or at least diminish legislative opposition to same-sex 
marriage). For their part, Massachusetts lawmakers took up a civil union bill and 
asked the court if such a bill would satisfy Goodridge. Even though the 
Massachusetts court turned down this request, the stay succeeded in drawing 
lawmakers into the process and, in so doing, changing the baseline about same-
sex unions away from legislative opposition and toward some form oflegislative 
acceptance. 68 
For a court interested both in advancing its vision of constitutional truth and 
maximizing its power, Goodridge is a masterstroke. The court had good reason to 
think its decision would not be overturned by a constitutional amendment; the 
court facilitated public and legislative acceptance of its decision by delaying the 
effective date of the remedy and remanding the case to the state legislature; and 
the court created a remedial delay that allowed it the opportunity to back away 
from its ruling if there were severe public and legislative opposition. Also, as 
justices on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court are not subject to recall 
election, there was no risk of the decision limiting their ability to stay on the 
court. 
California: A Calculated Risk that Backfired. On May 15, 2008, the California 
Supreme Court overturned the state's ban on same-sex marriage.69 At that time, 
66. It is also possible that public awareness of same-sex couples who marry might 
mitigate opposition to same-sex marriage. This would be especially true if there were 
favorable newspaper and television coverage about the same-sex couples who choose to 
marry. As it turns out, opposition to same-sex marriage did wane after same-sex couples 
began to marry. See jacobi supra note 51. 
67. Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 , 958 (Mass. 2003) . 
68. For a more detailed presentation of this idea, see jacobi, supra note 51, at 28-38. 
69. In reMarriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008) . 
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the justices had good reason to think that their decision both matched prevailing 
social and political forces and was especially vulnerable to political attack On the 
one hand, public opinion polls , the action of state lawmakers and Governor 
Schwarzenegger, and editorial commentary by the state's leading newspaper all 
suggested that California was ready to embrace gay marriage. On the other, anti-
gay marriage groups had mobilized after the court agreed to decide the case so 
that California voters would have an opportunity to vote on a proposed constitu-
tional amendment that would ban same-sex marriage. On November 4, 2008, 
California voters narrowly approved this amendment.7° 
Therefore, the California Supreme Court was simultaneously sensitive and 
tone deaf to the central lessons of this chapter. By granting certiorari to hear this 
case in December 2006, the California court paid insufficient attention both to 
the risks of in-state backlash and to the out-of-state backlash that followed 
Goodridge. When deciding the case, however, the court had good reason to strike 
down the state prohibition of same-sex marriage. At that time, the risks of in-
state backlash, while substantial, did not warrant the court's retreat from its 
preferred position in the case. 
When agreeing to rule on the constitutionality of same-sex marriage, the 
California Supreme Court was certainly aware of the backlash against same-sex 
marriage that followed Goodridge and the contemporaneous efforts oflocalities, 
most notably San Francisco, to recognize it. Indeed, the case was an appeal by 
San Francisco of a state appeals court ruling that nullified San Francisco mayor 
Gavin Newsom's efforts to grant marriage licenses to about 4,000 same-sex 
couples. More than that, the court knew that post-Goodridge efforts to constitu-
tionalize same-sex marriage had failed. In 2006, two state supreme courts, 
Washington and New York, reaffirmed state prohibitions on same-sex marriage 
and a third state supreme court, New Jersey, concluded that the state must allow 
for civil unions but not same-sex marriage. 
The California court also knew that well-funded Christian conservatives were 
poised to put an initiative against same-sex marriage on the 2008 ballot. With 
2006 public opinion polls showing that Californians opposed same-sex marriage 
by a 50 to 44 percent margin, the court had good reason to fear that a decision 
legalizing same-sex marriage would be turned back by voters. In particular, the 
California Constitution is far easier to amend then most state constitutions. A 
constitutional amendment initiative is placed on the ballot after 8 percent of the 
total voters in the last gubernatorial race sign a petition calling for the amend-
ment. And once on the ballot, a simple majority is sufficient to amend the 
Constitution. For this very reason, the California Constitution is routinely 
amended-so much so that at eight times the length of the U.S. Constitution, it 
70. In May 2009, the California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8 while simultane-
ously declaring it did not nullify same-sex marriages performed before its enactment. 
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has been labeled a "bloated mishmash" filled with "obfuscation, clutter and 
dysfunction. "71 
Put another way: California was no Massachusetts. Unlike the Massachusetts 
court, the California court could not escape the fact that its Constitution was 
especially vulnerable to amendment and that a decision backing same-sex mar-
riage might well be turned back by California voters.72 The California court, 
moreover, was well aware of on-the-ground facts that cut against its recognizing 
a right to same-sex marriage. Not only were opponents of same-sex marriage 
poised to launch an initiative drive, voters in thirteen states, responding to the 
efforts of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and Mayor Newsom, had in 
2004 approved constitutional amendment initiatives outlawing same-sex mar-
riage. And while the pendulum of public opinion was shifting in favor of same-
sex unions, there was little reason for the California court to think that public 
opposition to same-sex marriage would turn into voter support for it during the 
window between December 2006 (when the court agreed to hear the case) and 
November 2008 (when California voters would almost certainly be asked to 
approve a constitutional ban on it) . 
Lessons from other states as well as in-state political realities suggest that the 
California court jumped the gun. The court should have held off on deciding this 
question for a few more years, when public support for same-sex marriage was 
likely to command clear majority support among California voters. In making 
this point, I do not mean to suggest that when granting certiorari in this case, the 
court should have known that a decision legalizing same-sex marriage was 
doomed to fail. Leading state newspapers supported same-sex marriage, state 
lawmakers approved a bill legalizing same-sex marriage in September 2005, and 
Governor Schwarzenegger's veto of that bill signaled that he too would support 
a court ruling backing same-sex marriage rights. In particular, the governor's 
veto message said that the power to negate California's law banning same-sex 
marriage (passed by a 2000 voter initiative) was reserved to state courts (which 
could declare the initiative unconstitutional) or "another vote of the people of our 
state."73 Also, by December 2006, Massachusetts voters and lawmakers had 
rallied behind same-sex marriage, suggesting that the political landscape of2004 
71. Edward L. Lascher Jr. et al., It 's Too Easy to Amend the California Constitution, L.A. 
TrMES, Feb. 4, 2009. 
72. In drawing a comparison between the constitutional amendment process in 
California and Massachusetts, this discussion assumes that the nullification of state court 
decisions by voter initiatives is the very type of backlash that state courts should seek to 
avoid. With that said, a competing argument can be made-namely, that states with easy-
to-amend constitutions should engage voters in constitutional dialogues by staking out 
positions that voters and lawmakers might not independently pursue. 
73. Michael Finnegan & Maura Dolan, Citing Prop. 22, Gov. Rejects Gay Marriage Bill, 
L. A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005 at 1. 
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might give way to increasing public, elite, and lawmaker support. In other words , 
the California court may have taken a strategic gamble: thinking it could make 
history by riding the crest of a growing wave in support of same-sex marriage 
rights. 
One final comment about the California Supreme Court's decision to hear the 
same-sex marriage case: in determining whether it should run risks in order to 
recognize a state constitutional right to same-sex marriage, the court may have 
considered two other variables. First, even if the court refused to hear this case, 
it is quite possible that opponents of same-sex marriage would have pushed for 
a ballot initiative amending the state constitution. Second, unlike Vermont, there 
was little to be gained by staking out a middle-ground position by establishing a 
right to civil unions. California's then-existing domestic partnership laws granted 
domestic partners most of the same rights and responsibilities as marriage 
under California law. These laws, moreover, were politically popular-a 2003 
effort to repeal these laws through a state-wide initiative did not attract enough 
signatures even to make it to the ballot. For this reason, the same-sex marriage 
issue was largely symbolic.74 
When the California court issued its decision in May 2008, elected officials , 
leading newspapers, and California voters supported same-sex marriage. A May 
2008 Field Poll found that California registered voters supported same-sex marriage 
by a 51 to 42 percent margin.75 For their part, state lawmakers reenacted a bill 
legalizing same-sex marriage in 2007. And although Governor Schwarzenegger 
vetoed that bill, the governor had also declared one month before the court's 
ruling that efforts to amend the state constitution to ban same-sex marriage were 
a "total waste of time" and that he would "fight against that." Mayors of California's 
three largest cities (Los Angeles , San Diego, and San Francisco) all backed same-
sex marriage as did nearly all of the state's leading newspapers. 
Against this backdrop, the California Supreme Court, having already spurred 
on a voter initiative by agreeing to decide the case, had no reason to back away 
from its preferred ·position on this issue. The fact that California voters rejected 
same-sex marriage does not undercut this conclusion; instead, the populist repu-
diation of same-sex marriage underscores the fact that states with easy-to-amend 
constitutions should be especially sensitive to the risks of in-state backlash. In 
other words, it was not enough that voters, the media , and the political establish-
ment in California were more supportive of same-sex marriage than in other states. 
The California Court, when agreeing to decide the same-sex marriage issue, 
74. When upholding Proposition 8, the California Supreme Court emphasized that 
Proposition 8 did not fundamentally change the legal rights of same-sex couples, which 
suggests the Court might have reached a different conclusion if Proposition 8 meaning-
fully curtailed fundamental rights. Strauss v. California, 46 Cal. 4th 364 (2009) . 
75. Bill Ainsworth, 51 percent Support Same-Sex Marriage, THE SAN DI EGO UNION-
TRIB UNE, May 28, 2008 at Al. 
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should have paid more attention to the risks of in-state backlash-risks amplified 
by nationwide resistance to same-sex marriage after Goodridge. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
State courts can and should participate in a nationwide conversation about con-
stitutional values. State courts must also operate as independent sovereigns and, 
consequently, cannot consider the extraterritorial effects of their decisions. This 
chapter has suggested that state courts can thread this needle by paying attention 
to the experiences of other states in sorting out whether their rulings may prompt 
a counterproductive in-state backlash. In this way, state courts simultaneously 
operate as independent sovereigns while participating in a nationalistic conver-
sation about core constitutional values-values that transcend any one state. 
The ongoing battle over same-sex marriage exemplifies the ways states can 
retain their sovereignty while simultaneously learning from the experiences of 
other states. The on-the-ground facts of same-sex marriage changed dramatically 
from 1993 to 2008. State courts should have paid attention to those changes, 
especially the intra- and interstate ramifications of other state court decisions. In 
so doing, state courts could have learned effectively to marshal resources and 
render decisions that would prove politically acceptable to voters and elected offi-
cials in their states. Needless to say, profound differences among state court sys-
tems allow some states to recognize rights claims that other states cannot. Most 
significant, states with easy-to-amend constitutions need to be especially sensi-
tive to the risks of counterproductive populist attacks on their decision making. 
State courts should pay attention to the ways in which they are both similar 
and different from each other and, in so doing, participate in a nationwide con-
versation about rights. For this very reason, state supreme courts should recog-
nize that justice delayed may not be justice denied. By paying attention to in-state 
but not out-of-state backlash, state courts can respect their essential sovereignty 
while being a part of the new judicial federalism. 
